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IAC-D-1/1

8 November 1950

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR YUGOSLAVIA

The Problem:

To estimate the current situation in Yugoslavia and its effect on the world balance of power.

Scope:

This estimate is designed to indicate the importance of the survival of the Tito regime, both from the point of view of the US and of the USSR; to analyze current Yugoslav economic difficulties in terms of their internal effects, the degree to which they increase Cominform capabilities for the overthrow of Tito, and the extent to which US aid might be successful in maintaining the regime in power.

Suggested Outline:

- I. What is the importance to the US of the survival of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia?
 - A. What is the value to the non-Communist world of the continued existence of this example of Communist disunity?
 - B. What is the value of Yugoslav cooperation in the UN?
- II. What is the importance to the USSR of eliminating the Titoist heresy?
 - A. Does the USSR consider the Titoist heresy so dangerous that it must eventually be eradicated at all costs?
 - B. Would any compromise between the two countries be conceivable?

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III. What is the stability or instability of the Tito regime?

- A. What are the Tito regime's internal difficulties (considered without regard to Cominform exploitation of Western aid)?
1. Was disaffection with the Tito government widespread or serious before the drought?
 2. To what extent has it increased?
 3. Is this discontent generally expressed in terms of the Communist nature of the regime? Its oppressive and dictatorial nature? Its policy of opposition to the Cominform? The desire on the part of Yugoslav groups for return of a former regime?
 4. Apart from aid or intervention, would Tito have the necessary strength to control popular discontent during the period of economic stress?
- B. What are the prospects for attempts on the part of the Cominform to exploit the current situation for the overthrow of Tito?
1. To what extent are the Yugoslav people -- or any influential group in Yugoslavia -- susceptible to Cominform propaganda claims? for example, the economic conditions would be better if Yugoslavia return to the Soviet fold? that Tito is doomed in any case and, therefore, prudence would dictate individual opposition to Tito? that Tito is selling Yugoslavia out to Western Capitalist-Imperialists?
 2. Is Tito so weakened that Cominform-directed guerrilla activities or other forms of subversive or quasi-military activity would promise success?
 3. Is the current situation in Yugoslavia sufficiently unstable to encourage direct military action by the USSR? or by the Soviet Satellites bordering on Yugoslavia?
- C. What US aid would be required to maintain the Tito regime?

*What are possibilities of compromise?
S: not unless Tito is all were eliminated*

Can US aid be exploited to gain (1) intelligence (2) covert base

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- 1.. What is the scope and character of US economic aid needed to tide the Tito government over until Yugoslav economic conditions improve?
2. Given relief from drought conditions in 1951, how long is it likely to be before Yugoslavia will cease to need US aid?
3. Approximately what is the minimum aid needed by Yugoslavia to ensure maintenance of the regime during the critical period?
4. Is any military aid needed, and if so what would be its nature and extent?
5. Can US aid be exploited for the long-term improvement of US relations with Yugoslavia and the weakening of any tendencies toward accommodation with the Cominform?

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